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1.  Executive Summary 
This brief focuses on three issues that are especially 
important in the long-term development of the 
climate regime: (a) the challenge of the 
fragmentation  of negotiations and governance 
systems; (b) the challenge of steering and evaluating 
novel types of privatised and market-based 
governance  mechanisms; and (c) the challenge of 
designing architectures for global adaptation 
governance. These three core issues of 
fragmentation, privatisation and adaptation can be 
related to the overarching need to define the 
architecture of the post-2012 regime – and of any 
subsequent regimes that may follow a Copenhagen 
agreement. 
Our research shows that fragmentation ranges from 
climate-specific institutions to a broader 
fragmentation between climate institutions and 
regimes with universal or cross-issue portfolios. Our 
findings indicate that climate governance could be 
strengthened with increased cross-institutional co-
ordination, especially between the UN climate 
regime and the world trade regime, where many 
interlinkages exist. Our work also indicates that 
governments should continue to explore 
opportunities for further issue linking – more than 
has thus far been the case. In specific terms we 
propose that countries or country coalitions consider 
aspects from related policy processes in their 
climate strategies, including broader side-payments 
and package deals. 
One of the novel developments of climate 
governance has been the creation of carbon markets 
to make emission reductions for private parties more 
cost-effective. Here we explore specific dilemmas 
surrounding two key mechanisms in use to date, the 
Clean Development Mechanism and emission 
trading schemes. When reforming the CDM to 
account for its main problems (unequal geographical 
distribution, lack of sustainable benefits, complex 
bureaucracy), a balance must be struck between 
different interests. With respect to emissions 
trading, a major problem is how to link the different 
schemes that are in place or under development. 
While a top-down approach might offer greater 
environmental effectiveness, a bottom-up approach 
is more likely to emerge since it may politically 
more feasible. 
The final section in this Policy Brief addresses the 
emerging need for a global governance system on 
adaptation to climate change. Climate adaptation is 
becoming a reality of world politics in the 21
st 
century. The required level of adaptation may 
exceed the institutional capacities of many nations, 
which raises questions as to what institutions are in 
need of redesign and strengthening and to what 
extent new institutions and governance mechanisms 
are required. Little research exists in this domain. 
Our work outlines carefully drafted proposals for 
additional institutions that focus on climate-induced 
refugees and the assurance of food security. 
2.  Introduction 
The year 2009 will mark a crucial juncture in the 
evolution of the global climate regime: in 2012, the 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will 
expire. By all expectations, in order to enter into 
force on time, a new agreement for the next period 
will have to be decided upon at the 2009 conference 
of the parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen. Yet, 
given the current disagreement between major 
industrialised countries – notably the United States, 
Russia and the European Union – and between 
industrialised and developing countries, reaching 
agreement by 2009 would appear to be a tall order. 
At present, it is still far from certain that 
governments will be able to agree upon a post-
Kyoto ‘Copenhagen Protocol’.  
The European Union is seen as a crucial actor in this 
process. As a major emitter with a relatively 
climate-concerned population, and as a region with 
a strong emphasis on multilateralism and global co-
operation, the EU seems well positioned to play a 
major role in brokering a global deal. And yet, how 
this compromise can eventually be reached remains 
unclear.  
The issues at stake in current negotiations are too 
multifarious to be addressed in one paper. This fifth
1 
ADAM-CEPS Policy Brief thus focuses on three 
issues that the ADAM project believes are 
especially important in the long-term development 
of the climate regime. These core policy issues are 
the challenge of fragmentation of negotiations and 
governance systems; the challenge of steering and 
evaluating novel types of privatised and market-
based governance mechanisms; and the challenge of 
designing architectures for global adaptation 
governance in the absence of any precedence. By 
and large, these three core issues of fragmentation, 
privatisation and adaptation can be related to the 
overarching need to define the architecture of the 
                                                      
1 The first three ADAM-CEPS policy briefs are based on 
discussions during a science-policy seminar held at CEPS 
on 1
  October 2007 in the context of the European 
Commission Green Paper on Adaptation: “Why we will 
need adaptation and how it can be implemented” 
(Aaheim and Aasen, 2008; Aaheim et al., 2008; McEvoy 
et al., 2008). The fourth ADAM-CEPS policy brief is 
based on a science-policy seminar held at CEPS on 4
 
April 2008 on “The future of European electricity: 
choices before 2020” (Eskeland et al., 2008). Climate Governance Post-2012 | 3 
post-2012 regime – and of any subsequent regimes 
that may follow a Copenhagen agreement. 
The first challenge – fragmentation of negotiations 
and governance systems – refers to larger 
developments in climate governance in recent years 
that have become a major concern for decision-
makers and observers alike. Examples are efforts of 
the US to create parallel international fora for 
climate policy (e.g. Asia-Pacific Partnership, 
Meeting of Major Economies). However, 
fragmentation is not per se disadvantageous. More 
diverse institutional systems could lead to better 
policy outcomes by allowing for innovation and the 
diffusion of novel ideas. The relative advantages 
and disadvantages of fragmentation of climate 
governance are thus a question for analysis that we 
address in section 3 of this Policy Brief.  
Second, climate governance is among all 
international environmental policy domains the one 
where market-based mechanisms and the role of the 
private sector are strongest. A core question is the 
effectiveness of these new mechanisms – do they 
deliver the emissions reductions that are needed to 
reach environmental goals? Equally important are 
other effects of market-based mechanisms and the 
involvement of industry: what are their allocative 
effects in terms of distribution of income between 
different industries, but also between nations, 
notably between north and south, and between 
different southern countries? Also crucial are 
questions of democratic accountability and 
legitimacy of these new arrangements. These 
questions we address in section 4 of this Policy 
Brief. 
Third, this paper ventures to explore an emerging 
issue that has not yet reached its full potential within 
the post-2012 negotiations: the outline of a global 
governance system for the adaptation to climate 
change. Climate change might well require a level 
of adaptation that exceeds the capacities of most 
nations, and that makes adaptation to climate change 
one of the core issues of world politics in the 21
st 
century – including global security policy. Section 5 
of this Policy Brief presents two policy 
recommendations that have evolved from this 
research: the proposal to negotiate a UNFCCC 
Protocol on the Recognition, Protection, and 
Resettlement of Climate Refugees, and a proposal to 
negotiate a UNFCCC Adaptation Food Security 
Protocol. 
3.  Addressing institutional fragmentation 
The term ‘institutional fragmentation’ describes 
situations of overlapping international norms and 
institutions – with different legal status, 
constituencies, spatial scopes or predominant 
subject matters – in one issue area. We use this term 
– which is widely employed in legal research 
(Hafner, 2004; Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002) – 
without negative or positive connotation. In climate 
governance, fragmentation extends to different 
spheres, from the fragmentation of ‘purely’ climate-
specific institutions towards a broader fragmentation 
between climate institutions and regimes and 
organisations with universal or cross-issue 
portfolios. In the ADAM programme, we have 
researched advantages and disadvantages of such 
institutional fragmentation with regard to the 
environmental, economic and social effectiveness of 
climate governance. While institutional 
fragmentation may have some benefits, serious 
disadvantages can arise, for instance from gaps in 
co-ordination (for more details on our methods and 
findings, see Biermann et al., 2007; Boeters et al., 
2007; Hof et al., 2007). 
Based on these results, there are various policy 
options to enhance cross-institutional co-ordination 
on climate change. Of specific importance is the 
overlap between the UN climate regime and the 
WTO. This overlap affects several core elements of 
the climate regime. For one, there are material 
interlinkages between the goals of both regimes 
(that is, climate change and climate policies 
affecting trade, trade and trade liberalisation 
affecting climate change). In addition, there are 
various overlapping policy processes in the UN 
climate regime and the WTO (see for instance 
Asselt and Biermann, 2007; Biermann and Brohm, 
2005; Brewer, 2004; Zelli, 2007). Topics that fall 
into this overlap between both regimes include trade 
in emission allowances,
2 unilateral policies and 
measures (e.g. border cost or border tax 
adjustments, subsidies, and technical standards), and 
                                                      
2 Collision with GATT or GATS rules is not likely for the 
primary carbon market, i.e. trade in allowances by end-
users, since emission permits are neither goods nor 
services. However, there might be overlaps for the 
secondary market, i.e. trade in derivative financial 
instruments based upon allowances: “If the ETS rules 
allow financial-service providers to buy, own, and hold 
allowances, the EC and its Member States may be under a 
GATS obligation to extend MFN and national treatment 
to foreign services and service suppliers” (Werksman, 
2001, p. 171). Depending on the design of the ETS, 
especially on the point of a carbon-based fuel cycle, at 
which allowances are required, the trading scheme could 
run counter to WTO provisions. This holds especially for 
upstream allocations requested from energy producers, 
since, whenever exporting their energy to another ETS 
country, such allocations would be equal. 4 | Biermann, van Asselt, Boas, Massey, Pattberg, Edenhofer, Flachsland, Neufeldt, Zelli, Stripple & Alessi 
transfer of climate-friendly goods, services and 
technologies.
3 
While the potential legal overlaps between the UN 
climate regime and the WTO on these issues have 
been the object of extensive academic discussions, 
there are also political overlaps, that is, parties are 
discussing these issues in both regimes. To a certain 
extent, the UN climate regime and the WTO have 
reached a division of labour. For instance, the WTO 
discusses trade barrier removals for environmental 
goods and services, while the climate convention 
negotiations address technology needs of 
developing countries. This notwithstanding, the EU 
early on called for discussions and negotiations on 
the relationship between the WTO and international 
environmental regimes. These discussions, which 
also touch upon climate-related issues, are mostly 
taking place in the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE).
4 
The choice of the forum where such overlapping 
issues are discussed is sensitive. The IPCC Third 
Assessment Report directly refers to this problem in 
questioning whether the CTE is the “appropriate 
forum to resolve these questions [of trade measures 
for environmental purposes]” (IPCC, 2001, p. 435). 
Moreover, climate-related discussions in the WTO 
are often held hostage by larger debates. For 
instance, no permanent WTO observer status has 
been granted to the climate convention, mainly 
because of objections from members of the Arab 
League. Likewise, WTO negotiations on the 
removal of trade barriers for environmental goods 
and services have not significantly advanced, as 
several countries wait for an outcome of the Doha 
negotiations on farm subsides. Moreover, 
discussions on climate-trade overlaps outside of the 
WTO have been limited to certain ministries, for 
example trade ministers at the 2007 Bali meeting, or 
                                                      
3 Another much-debated overlapping issue is bunker 
fuels, especially plans to include international aviation in 
the EU-ETS. However, this overlap does not involve the 
WTO, but the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO). The EU Commission has proposed that, at the 
start of 2012, the EU-ETS shall be expanded to cover 
emissions from all international flights – from or to 
anywhere in the world – that arrive at or depart from an 
EU airport. In its response, the US government has 
considered these plans as unlawful under the Chicago 
Convention on Civil Aviation of 1944, which is 
administered by the ICAO. In September 2007, the US 
Ambassador to the EU, Boyden Gray, even considered a 
lawsuit should the EU further pursue its plans (Brewer, 
2008, p. 15).  
4 For the Doha Round in 2001, key discussions on 
environment-trade overlaps take place in the Special 
Session of the CTE (CTE-SS). 
environmental ministers during climate 
negotiations. 
In a joint workshop with the Economics and Trade 
Branch of the UN Environment Programme, the 
ADAM team has discussed these deadlocked 
debates and climate-trade-overlaps with chief 
experts, non-state representatives, and policy-
makers from the UN, the WTO, and governments. 
Three issues stood at the centre: 
1.  On the level of international institutions, the 
need to bring in further expertise to inform 
discussions on climate and trade; 
2.  On the level of intergovernmental co-ordination, 
the need to broaden dialogues across institutions 
to overcome negotiation deadlocks; and 
3.  On the level of governments, the need to 
integrate strategies on related problems. 
As for the first point, experts agreed that current 
discussions on the climate-trade overlap focus too 
much on border cost adjustments. While the EU and 
recent bills discussed in the US Senate consider 
such measures, there is still high uncertainty about 
their implications for domestic and foreign 
industries, but also with regard to mitigating climate 
change. As for their climate-related effects, for 
instance, border cost adjustments cannot address all 
leakage-related concerns, and also do not directly 
create incentives to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in exporting countries. Some experts even 
hold that border cost adjustments could amount to 
discrimination for the protection of locally protected 
goods, and that they “could be seen as coercing 
countries to accept ambitious CO2 reduction 
commitments” (Quick, 2007, p. 174). A 
predominant focus on border cost adjustments as a 
panacea might lead to a patchwork of unilateral 
regulations, while missing other chances to address 
carbon leakage concerns, for example by providing 
positive mitigation incentives. In light of these 
caveats and the uncertainty on border cost 
adjustments, it is crucial to strengthen expert advice 
(see section 6.1 for more detailed proposals).  
Regarding the second and third points above, 
governments should further explore opportunities 
for cross-issue co-ordination. Such co-ordination 
can be furthered at the intergovernmental level, in 
the form of a cross-ministerial dialogue (see section 
6.1). Another way is to further co-ordinate or 
integrate strategies at the domestic level, that is, 
across ministries within one government. This idea 
of strategic issue linking implies that countries or 
country coalitions consider aspects from related 
policy processes in their strategies. Based on such 
integrated strategies, countries or country groups 
can reinvigorate discussions at the international Climate Governance Post-2012 | 5 
level, for example by tabling proposals for co-
ordination, side-payments or even package deals 
(see Cesar and De Zeeuw, 1996; Folmer et al., 1993; 
Zürn, 1990, pp. 166-73).  
Such agreements are not uncommon in international 
politics in general and international trade in 
particular, and they have been included in 
recommendations of IPCC reports (IPCC, 2001, pp. 
624-627). The most noteworthy example of a link 
between climate and trade interests is Russia’s 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in early November 
2004 – which secured the Protocol’s entry into force 
90 days later. With this step, Russia’s President 
Putin followed recurrent requests by EU member 
countries that had made their support for Russia’s 
WTO accession contingent upon Moscow’s 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Henry and 
Sundstrom, 2007; Kotov, 2004, p; 158ff.). 
Yet package deals are no panacea. While the 
potential number of issue linkages between climate 
and trade is very large, most are neither feasible nor 
sensible. Caveats to consider include: 
•  Forum.  Linking issues raises questions about 
institutional mandates and jurisdiction. Not all 
actors may consider the CTE or other WTO 
committees as the appropriate forums to discuss 
climate-related issues. The choice of forum 
where such linkages are first discussed needs to 
accommodate such concerns.  
•  Nature of Issues. As climate negotiations 
provide a public good, that is, a good with non-
excludable benefits, incentives are high to free 
ride. To reduce this, issue linking is sensible 
especially in negotiations on issues with 
excludable benefits, for example deals on 
technology transfer.  
•  Country Positions. The agendas of both post-
2012 climate governance and the Doha 
negotiations are overburdened, which slows 
down progress (ICTSD, 2008). Additional 
topics could hence easily make matters worse. 
The choice of topics therefore needs to 
guarantee balanced benefits for all parties. 
Moreover, in the Doha Round, trade topics tend 
to be more important to parties than climate 
concerns. This imbalance of preferences needs 
to be taken into account.  
Bearing these caveats in mind, we have explored 
two possibilities of integrated issue-linking 
strategies. These strategies are listed in section 6.1, 
along with other suggestions for broadening the 
debate on the overlap between climate and trade. 
4.  Market-based mechanisms 
Despite current disagreements over the details of a 
post-2012 climate policy architecture, carbon 
markets are a central feature in most proposals on 
how to move society towards a low carbon 
economy. With over ten years passing since the 
negotiations in Kyoto, it has become evident that 
Kyoto was crucial in ‘putting a price on carbon’ and 
thereby channelling clean energy investments 
around the world. However, the exact role and 
relevance of market-based governance schemes for 
climate change mitigation in any post-2012 
agreement is still largely unclear. 
Carbon markets do not emerge spontaneously but 
have to be crafted by political decisions. 
Governmental agreements are needed for generating 
both the supply and the demand for carbon dioxide 
reductions. The main trend in climate governance 
has been the creation of carbon markets in order to 
make emission reductions more cost-effective. 
Carbon markets work on the premise that carbon 
emissions (including information about carbon 
emissions) can be treated as a tradeable commodity. 
Central to the process of carbon ‘commodification’ 
is a set of rules for participation, allocation and 
credit generation including monitoring, reporting 
and verification as well as knowledge about actors, 
emissions, baselines, behaviour and additionality
 of 
emission reductions. 
There are two main systems by which the 
underlying commodity (usually the permit to emit a 
ton of carbon dioxide equivalents) is created: cap 
and trade systems and baseline and credit systems. 
A cap-and-trade market is created when a collective 
of emitters within a certain jurisdiction receive a 
‘cap’ on their emissions. Within that cap, emitters 
are allowed to trade the allowances between 
themselves. In a baseline-and-credit market, the 
carbon credits are equal to the difference between 
emissions after emission-curbing measures vis-à-vis 
the baseline (emissions with business as usual). The 
cap and the baseline, respectively, are essential in 
the commodification process. We can further 
distinguish between compliance markets, which 
result from public regulation (e.g. the Kyoto 
Protocol or national emission trading schemes), and 
voluntary markets, which do not rely on public 
regulation to generate demand. Compliance markets 
as well as voluntary markets might be designed as 
cap and trade systems or as baseline and credit 
systems. These distinctions result in the following 
typology (see table below). Our research has 
investigated two specific mechanisms – the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and 
emissions trading – with a view towards existing 
structural and institutional shortcomings and 
potential reform options. 6 | Biermann, van Asselt, Boas, Massey, Pattberg, Edenhofer, Flachsland, Neufeldt, Zelli, Stripple & Alessi 
Carbon 
markets 
Compliance market  Voluntary market 
Cap and trade 
 
Kyoto Emissions 
Trading 
EU ETS 
New South Wales 
RGGI, WRCAI 
Individual Carbon 
Trading (not yet 
implemented 
anywhere) 
Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) 
Baseline and 
credit 
CDM, JI  Voluntary Carbon 
Offsetting 
4.1  Clean Development Mechanism 
Within the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows 
industrialised countries to generate emission credits 
through investment in emission reduction projects in 
developing countries. The CDM aims at providing 
low-cost emissions reductions to Annex 1 countries, 
while at the same time facilitating technology 
transfer, increase the flow of capital from rich to 
poor countries, and to provide sustainable 
development in developing countries. Because the 
role of developing countries in a future climate 
regime is a major issue in climate negotiations, the 
CDM becomes crucial since it is the only part of the 
Kyoto Protocol that provides an active role for 
developing countries. However, this linking of 
delivering cost-efficient reductions and providing 
development assistance has come under criticism. 
Current discussions highlight the potential trade-off 
between implementing the CDM in middle-income 
countries that have the adequate technical and 
knowledge infrastructures to deliver successful 
projects and the political goal of making the CDM 
more inclusive.  
As a market, the CDM seems to be able to provide 
significant volumes of emission reductions for 
industrialised countries. In May 2008, there were 
3498 CDM projects under validation and 
registration in the CDM project pipeline. In 2007, 
551 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent to 
7426 million US$ were managed under the CDM. 
The current project pipeline has the capacity to 
reduce 2500 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent and the CDM may have generated around 
1000 millions of Certified Emission Reductions by 
2012. The average price of a CER was between €10 
(money upfront) and €17 (paid on delivery). Despite 
this relative success in terms of market indicators, 
climate governance through the CDM is contested, 
in particular based on the observation that it is 
unevenly spread across the globe. Three countries 
(China, India and Brazil) account for two thirds of 
the projects and as regions, Latin America and the 
Asia and Pacific region host 96% of the projects. 
Africa has earlier been bypassed in the CDM 
investments flows, but has now somewhat risen to 
hold a market share of 5% of transacted volumes of 
Certified Emission Reductions even though the 
number of projects (74) is still rather low. In the 
years to come there is uncertainty about the space in 
which offsets could operate. Without targets of over 
30% reductions in industrialised countries there is 
no real role for the CDM to play.  
With regard to the CDM, it is important to always 
keep an eye on ‘why we have the CDM’ and if the 
CDM is moving us any closer to the global 
reduction of greenhouse gases. The CDM has been 
subject to a critical academic and political debate 
during the last few years. Most assessments have 
come to rather moderate evaluations. These studies 
acknowledge that the CDM is working quite well in 
terms of its ability to provide Certified Emission 
Reductions, but also highlight problems such as (1) 
the unequal geographical distribution of projects, (2) 
the lack of sustainable development benefits from 
many projects and (3) a complex bureaucratic 
process. We conclude that the market structure of 
the CDM and the resulting focus on cost-efficient 
emissions reductions are at the root of the problem. 
However, it is interesting to note that among some 
of the more developed host countries (e.g. Chile); 
CDM credits are treated as just another export 
product, while the lack of sustainable development 
benefits from projects is not seen as an issue.  
Recently, the question of additionality has moved up 
the agenda again. According to the Kyoto Protocol, 
emission reductions generated by the Clean 
Development Mechanism must be additional to 
those that would otherwise occur. Additionality is 
established when there is a positive difference 
between the emissions that occur in the baseline 
scenario, and the emissions that occur in the 
proposed project. Yet several authors have now 
questioned the way additionality is assessed. 
Michaelowa and Purohit (2007) argue that the 
information provided in the project design document 
in many cases is insufficient for assessing 
additionality in a transparent way, and that the 
packaging of information also seems to affect the 
result of the additionality test. Schneider (2007) 
contends that it is likely that “a significant amount 
of registered projects” are non-additional. 
Suspicions like these might bring the environmental 
integrity of the CDM into doubt, and are thus to be 
dealt with urgently if the CDM is to be carried 
forward into a new phase of the climate regime. 
However, it should be noted that designing an 
additionality test is in the end an optimisation 
problem: a balance has to be struck so that not too 
many non-additional projects are allowed under the Climate Governance Post-2012 | 7 
CDM, and not too many truly additional projects are 
ruled out.  
Most authors anticipate that the CDM will be a part 
of the climate regime also post-2012 (Streck and 
Lin, 2008), perhaps in combination with more 
flexible levels of commitments so that some 
developing countries are able to take on binding 
commitments (Christiansen, 2004). But what are the 
existing options? Some scholars suggest that the 
CDM should be reserved for the least developed 
countries (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007). It is likely 
that the CDM will change when a new post-2012 
climate governance architecture is agreed upon. 
There are many ideas on the table for scaling-up the 
current project-based CDM to ‘programmatic CDM’ 
(to allow many project activities to become part of 
one large CDM project), ‘sectoral CDM’ (to credit 
vis-à-vis a sectoral baseline) or ‘policy CDM’ (to 
allow an activity that falls under a government 
policy to claim credits) in order to generate larger 
amounts of emission reductions as well as enabling 
the CDM to better facilitate societal transformations 
to low carbon emission trajectories. In the 
discussions on the role of CDM post-2012, the idea 
of a sectoral CDM is frequently brought forward. 
Sectoral CDM is seen as promising since it is 
assumed to contribute to the structural changes 
necessary to promote the long-term mitigation of 
GHG emissions in developing countries, and could 
also make projects with larger sustainable 
development benefits viable under the CDM (Sterk 
and Wittneben, 2006). However, an up-scaled 
CDM, whether in the form of a sectoral approach or 
not, requires new arrangements both for assessing 
additionality and for calculating emission 
reductions. It remains to be seen how these 
suggestions will fit the overarching direction of 
international climate policy. 
4.2  Emissions Trading 
A second challenge for designing market-based 
post-2012 governance architectures is further 
developing international emissions trading. 
Economically, a global emissions trading system 
with a single price for greenhouse gases in all 
sectors and world regions would be the most 
efficient quantity instrument for mitigating climate 
change. There are, however, different roads to 
establishing such a global system.  
Top down approaches aim at implementing 
emissions trading at the government level through 
multilateral negotiations, while leaving the domestic 
implementation to participating countries. In an 
ideal case, every country in the world would adopt a 
cap, resulting in a comprehensive global emissions 
trading system. Such a global carbon market may be 
part of a global deal on mitigating climate change in 
the long run. However, several world regions are 
reluctant to assume binding caps for fear of adverse 
impacts on their economic growth. Despite this 
reluctance the EU put its emissions trading scheme 
in place in 2005. The Kyoto trading system 
introduced binding caps for developed Annex-I 
countries (rejected however by the US) and 
introduced the CDM offsetting mechanism for 
integrating developing countries into the global 
carbon market.  
Bottom up approaches emphasise the 
implementation of domestic emissions trading 
systems by governments on the national or sub-
national level. Currently, domestic emissions 
trading systems are emerging all over the world. On 
the federal level New Zealand, Australia, 
Switzerland, the US, Canada, and Japan are 
considering or implementing trading systems. On 
the sub-national level, systems are in the process of 
planning or implementation in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, in California, in the 
Western Climate Initiative, and the Midwestern 
Greenhouse gas Accord in North America, and the 
Tokyo and Kyoto municipalities in Japan. 
Regarding the international integration of such 
domestic schemes, there are broadly three options. 
First, domestic emissions trading systems may 
remain unconnected. However, there will still be 
indirect linkages via international energy markets. 
Second, domestic emissions trading systems are 
linked indirectly if they commonly accept certain 
credits for example from CDM, which will lead to 
some price convergence. Third, domestic ETS are 
formally linked if they mutually accept their 
allowances for compliance.  
When formally linking different trading systems, the 
environmental and economic integrity of the 
resulting joint system needs to be ensured. In 
particular, design features with an impact on 
allowance prices and quantities and fundamentals 
such as well-designed monitoring and verification 
systems and compliance provisions need to be 
analysed with care (see Flachsland et al., 2008a). 
Also, linkages should be assessed against the 
background of the 2°c target of the European Union 
(EU Council, 2007). If the US were to implement a 
domestic emissions trading system, the creation of a 
transatlantic carbon market by linking such a system 
to the EU ETS could send out a strong signal for the 
further development of the international carbon 
market. The Asia Pacific region with emerging 
trading systems in New Zealand, Australia and 
Japan is another important prospect for linking the 
EU ETS (for more details on the options of linking 
see Flachsland et al., 2008b; for a discussion of the 
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systems to the EU ETS, see Flachsland et al., 
2008a).  
Because of their inclusiveness, top-down 
approaches tend to cover a larger share of global 
emissions and thus offer a higher degree of 
environmental effectiveness than bottom-up 
approaches. However, a significant share of global 
emissions could also be captured by means of a 
decentralised approach, in which a carbon market is 
created by linking existing domestic or regional 
ETS. The environmental effectiveness of both 
approaches can be enhanced by integrating baseline-
and-credit schemes, for example the CDM of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
If emissions price equalisation is the sole criterion, 
top-down approaches also fare better in terms of 
economic effectiveness. But if plausible market 
imperfections associated with emissions trade 
between governments (such as market power or 
information asymmetries) are taken into account, 
price equalisation is unlikely to be a sufficient 
criterion for efficiency, which requires the 
equalisation of marginal abatement costs. Bottom-
up approaches, based on pre-existing trading 
systems between companies, provide a more robust 
price signal, and can be very efficient once they are 
‘linked’.  
High political feasibility emerges as the main 
strength of bottom-up approaches, and, at the same 
time, the biggest hurdle for top-down architectures. 
For the latter, international agreement on burden 
sharing constitutes a key requirement. By contrast, 
the former lends itself to the formation of a 
coalition-of-the-willing with subsequent 
enlargements. It can be concluded that the perhaps 
intuitive view of bottom-up and top-down 
approaches as (imperfect) substitutes needs to be 
amended. In as much as bottom-up trading 
architectures bring about not the optimal, but the 
feasible, they remain a second-best alternative to a 
top-down global cap-and-trade system in terms of 
environmental effectiveness. However, when 
viewed as building blocks that allow putting a cost-
effective and expandable carbon market into place 
without further delay, their supportive role in the 
eventual establishment of a global carbon market 
becomes apparent.  
5.  Towards Global Adaptation 
Governance 
The need to mitigate climate change has until very 
recently dominated the debate on global 
environmental governance. Now it becomes evident 
that mitigation efforts have been too little and too 
late. Climate change adaptation has thus become a 
reality of world politics in the 21
st century. This 
situation requires a new, additional focus in both 
academic research and policy planning: How can we 
build systems of global governance over the course 
of the next decades that will cope with the global 
impacts of climate change? What institutions are in 
need of redesign and strengthening? To what extent, 
and in what areas, do we need to create new 
institutions and governance mechanisms from 
scratch?  
Not much policy research on these questions is 
available. In light of the most recent scientific 
findings, which indicate possibly accelerating 
climatic change, there is thus an urgent need for a 
new academic research programme on what we 
propose to call ‘global adaptation governance’. 
Global adaptation governance will affect most areas 
of world politics, including many core institutions 
and organisations of current global governance. The 
need to adapt to climate change will influence, for 
example, the structure of global food regimes and 
the work of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization; global health governance and the 
agenda of the World Health Organization; global 
trade in goods whose production will be harmed or 
helped by climate change; the world economic 
system and the ability of the International Monetary 
Fund to address climate-related shocks to national 
and regional economies; the World Bank and 
bilateral and national agencies in raising and 
distributing funds to support adaption; as well as 
many other sectors from tourism to transportation or 
even international security. 
Two of the most crucial governance needs, we 
argue, are the plight of ‘climate change refugees’, or 
‘climate refugees’ in short, as well as the global 
governance of food production and distribution. 
Regarding climate refugees, it is likely that climate 
change will fundamentally affect the lives of 
millions of people who will be forced over the next 
decades to leave their villages and cities to seek 
refuge in other areas. Although the exact numbers of 
climate refugees are unknown and vary from 
assessment to assessment depending on underlying 
methods, scenarios, timeframes and assumptions 
(Biermann and Boas, 2008, and forthcoming), the 
available literature indicates that the climate refugee 
crisis will surpass all known refugee crises in terms 
of the numbers of people affected. Many climate 
refugees may seek refuge in their own countries; 
others will need to cross borders to find a new 
home. Some local refugee crises, in particular in the 
richer countries in the north, may be prevented 
through adaptation measures such as reinforced 
coastal protection or changes in agricultural 
production and water supply management. Many 
poorer countries, however, are unlikely to be able to 
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climate-induced migration might be the only option 
for many communities in the south. In these 
situations, climate refugees will need to rely on 
effective protection and support from the 
international community, regardless of whether 
climate migration will be internal or transnational.  
It is apparent from our research that the current 
refugee protection regime of the United Nations is 
poorly prepared. At present, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees deals with merely 
ten million refugees. It is doubtful whether this 
institution can protect and support, without major 
reforms, a stream of refugees that is possibly 
twenty-times larger. The UN High Commissioner 
does not even have a legal mandate to protect people 
who flee their homes because of climate change. 
Instead, this mandate covers only individual 
political refugees who flee their countries because of 
state-led persecution based on race, religion, 
political opinion, or ethnicity.
 Climate refugees fall 
outside the mandate. 
At a meeting in the Maldives in 2006, delegates 
therefore proposed an amendment to the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees that would extend the mandate of the UN 
refugee regime to cover also climate refugees. Yet 
such an amendment, we argue, leads us in the wrong 
direction. It does not promise to effectively resolve 
the emerging climate refugee crisis. To start with, 
the political feasibility of this proposal is highly 
uncertain. Already today, the UN refugee regime is 
under constant pressure from industrialised 
countries that seek restrictive interpretations of its 
provisions. It is unrealistic that governments will 
extend the same level of protection to twenty-times 
more climate refugees, which is equal in numbers to 
half the population of the European Union. It is also 
highly doubtful whether the current institutional 
apparatus of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and the personalised refugee regime 
under the Geneva Convention, would be able to 
effectively protect and support a much larger stream 
of climate refugees. 
More importantly, the proposal of an extension of 
the UN refugee regime misses the core 
characteristics of the climate refugee crisis. Climate 
refugees do not have to leave their countries because 
of a totalitarian government. In principle, they still 
enjoy the protection of their government and their 
country. The protection of climate refugees is 
therefore essentially a development issue. It requires 
large-scale, long-term planned resettlement 
programmes for groups of affected people, mostly 
within their country. Often this will be in concert 
with adaptation programmes for other people who 
are not evacuated but can still be protected, for 
instance through strengthened coastal defences. It is 
therefore not the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees but other international agencies such as 
the UN Development Programme or the World 
Bank that are called upon to deal with the emerging 
problem.  
We argue therefore for a separate, independent legal 
and political regime: a Protocol on the Recognition, 
Protection, and Resettlement of Climate Refugees 
(“climate refugee protocol”) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (see in 
more detail Biermann and Boas, 2008, and 
forthcoming). We propose five core principles for 
such an agreement (Biermann and Boas, 
forthcoming). The first principle is that at its core 
must not be programmes on emergency response 
and disaster relief, but planned and voluntary 
resettlement and reintegration over periods of many 
years and decades. Spontaneous flights, as in the 
case of political turmoil or war, can then be avoided. 
The second principle is that climate refugees must 
be seen, and treated, as permanent immigrants to the 
regions or countries that accept them. Climate 
refugees cannot return to their homes, as political 
refugees can (at least in theory). The third principle 
is that the climate refugee regime must be tailored 
not to the needs of individually persecuted people 
(as in the current UN refugee regime), but of entire 
groups of people, such as populations of villages, 
cities, provinces or even entire nations, as in the 
case of small island states. Fourth, an international 
regime for climate refugees will be targeted less at 
the protection of persons outside their states but 
rather at the support of governments, local 
communities, and national agencies to protect 
people within their territory. The governance 
challenge of protecting and resettling climate 
refugees is thus essentially about international 
assistance and funding for the domestic support and 
resettlement programmes of affected countries that 
have requested such support. Fifth and finally, the 
protection of climate refugees must be seen as a 
global problem and a global responsibility. In most 
cases, climate refugees will be poor, and their own 
responsibility for the past accumulation of 
greenhouse gases will be small. By a large measure, 
the rich industrialised countries have caused most 
emissions in the past and at present, and it is thus 
these countries that have most moral, if not legal, 
responsibility for the victims of global warming. 
This does not imply the transnational migration of 
200 million climate refugees in the north. Yet it 
does imply the responsibility of the industrialised 
countries to do their share in financing, supporting, 
and facilitating the protection and the resettlement 
of climate refugees. 
The climate refugee protocol that we propose will 
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the resettlement of millions of climate refugees over 
the course of the century will be the task of existing 
agencies. Given the complexity of climate-related 
flight, the best model will be to mandate not one 
single agency but rather a network of agencies as 
‘implementing agencies’ of the protocol.  
Coupled with the issue of climate migration and 
perhaps a key determinant that could potentially 
drive people from their homes, villages, and 
countries is access and ability to produce sufficient 
amounts of safe and nutritious food. Enabling 
communities to domestically produce their own 
food for greater food security has long been on the 
agenda of international development agencies. 
Nevertheless, the UN estimates currently that nearly 
800 million people live in food insecure 
environments. While the causes of food insecurity 
cannot solely be attributed to fluctuating 
environmental conditions, there are a number of 
socio-economic and natural stressors to food 
systems that lead to food insecurity. A changing 
climate will have a significant impact on many 
already stressed communities. Agricultural research 
suggests that with a global rise in temperature, many 
staple cereal crops could be negatively affected due 
to heat and water stress. The three key impacts for 
agriculture are a depletion of ground water, reduced 
precipitation and changes – primarily a shortening – 
of the growing season, all which have the potential 
to reduce output yields. The IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report suggests that with a 2 to 3 
degree range of warming, by 2020 agricultural 
yields in Africa could decrease by as much as 50%. 
Other global agricultural climate models show that 
by 2080 there could be a significant decrease in 
maize, wheat, rice, soybeans and millet worldwide, 
especially in Latin America, South Asia and Africa. 
Conversely, some of these models show that at least 
by 2020 with 2 to 3 degrees of warming in northern 
climates such as those in Europe and North 
America, outputs of staple crops could increase. 
Given this expected shift in productivity, some form 
of adaptation must occur to ensure greater food 
security in regions that will be most vulnerable. The 
ADAM research has explored here what type of 
global governance systems would be most 
appropriate to facilitate adaptation for greater food 
security. So far, our research indicates that there 
needs to be a mechanism that allows for adaptation 
at the local level to help farmers and communities 
and at the same time ensures that there is a well 
functioning institutional system at the global level 
that supports the financing and implementation of 
adaptive measures, including improved farming 
techniques and technologies. 
 
6.  Policy options and recommendations 
6.1  The overlap between climate and 
trade policies 
In Section 3 we discussed major approaches to 
leverage negotiations on trade-related climate 
policies. Here, we focus on the policy options and 
recommendations that follow from our research.  
First, on the level of international institutions, it 
appears important to bring in further expertise to 
inform discussions on climate-trade issues and to 
move discussions away from mostly considering 
unilateral trade measures. One topic for which 
further expertise is needed is border cost 
adjustments. Our research indicates that the first-
best option is still a comprehensive climate 
agreement in which most countries accept binding 
(yet differentiated) commitments. Yet such a regime 
might not emerge soon, to the effect that some 
governments, including the European Union, have 
embarked on a discourse on border cost 
adjustments. Yet our research indicates that current 
knowledge is insufficient to understand the potential 
effects of such measures. It is thus crucial to first 
gather more evidence on the implications of border 
cost adjustments, including climate- and trade-
related effects, chances to discipline such measures 
in multilateral agreements, and indirect impact on 
climate negotiations (for example in light of 
perceptions by developing countries). Such evidence 
could be provided, for instance, by a separate 
chapter on unilateral and multilateral trade-related 
approaches in the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC. 
In the case that some governments opt for border 
cost adjustments unilaterally, such measures must 
build on an adequate scientific basis, that is, an 
adequate accounting system that tracks the carbon 
embedded in products. In addition, too pragmatic 
border cost adjustments systems that do not account 
for indirect inputs, such as electricity inputs, should 
be avoided. Limited border cost adjustments 
regimes cannot address leakage concerns in sectors 
where emissions largely result from electricity 
consumed in the production process, such as 
aluminium). One option to address the trade-off 
between pragmatism and accuracy could be a 
flexible system: one could start with default values 
of embedded carbon, and then give importers the 
chance to challenge the value for their respective 
product by providing new evidence. In the long run, 
such a flexible default-value system might even 
form the basis for a multilateral agreement, although 
this does not seem politically feasible today. 
A flexible expertise-based approach might also be 
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climate-trade overlap, the removal of trade barriers 
for climate-friendly goods and services. Instead of a 
fixed list of climate-friendly or environmental goods 
and services, the EU could propose a ‘living list’, 
which can be amended based on further scientific 
input.
5 For instance, building on carbon life-cycle 
analyses of goods and services, sustainability 
criteria for the removal of trade barriers could be 
developed. Such criteria could also refer to CO2-
related standards, which the International 
Standardization Organization (ISO) is developing. 
With regard to the transfer of climate-friendly 
technologies, another source of information to be 
considered are the Technology Needs Assessments 
that non-Annex II countries submit to the secretariat 
of the climate convention. Finally, further expert 
advice is needed on the role of intellectual property 
rights for the transfer of low-emission technologies.  
As regards intergovernmental co-ordination, it also 
appears important to broaden the dialogue across 
institutions to overcome negotiation deadlocks. One 
option for the EU is to initiate regular meetings 
between representatives from environmental, trade 
and development ministries. A crosscutting dialogue 
could help circumvent deadlocks in the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment. Moreover, 
regarding political sensitivities about the appropriate 
forum, such a dialogue could provide a platform to 
discuss overlap questions outside of the WTO. 
However, it seems important to arrange the dialogue 
across ministries instead of continuing the practice 
of separate meetings (such as the meeting of trade 
ministers during the last COP in Bali). 
Concerning strategic issue-linkages, there are two 
possibilities, depending on the level of ambition. 
More ambitious issue linking could connect broader 
policy objectives. An example of such an approach 
is the package deal around Russia’s ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Such linkages are often initiated 
by high-level government officials ad hoc 
depending on the current political situation. It is 
important for EU representatives to stay alert and 
explore similar opportunities, possibly also again 
with Russia.
6 Possible high-level forums to discuss 
                                                      
5 In discussions under DDA para. 31(iii) in the Doha 
Round, the EU and the US have proposed a list of 
environmental goods and services for which they 
demanded trade liberalisation. In addition, in a separate 
proposal that they tabled outside the Doha Round, the EU 
and the US have provided a more specific list of climate-
friendly goods and services (based on a World Bank 
study). 
6 For example, the EU could try to intensify its co-
operation on climate and energy with Russia, and 
possibly other countries like the Ukraine. The Russian 
economy has great potential for enhancing its energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. The EU, with its 
package deals are the G8, whose 2007 summit on a 
range of issues already gave a significant boost to 
UN climate negotiations, or the cross-ministerial 
dialogue we suggested earlier in this section. 
A more common type of issue-linking is to integrate 
country strategies, based on regular co-ordination, 
consultation and information exchange among 
representatives of a government, for example 
country negotiators in different forums of the 
climate convention. In the EU, such co-ordination is 
built on the Brussels-based working group of the 
Council, supported by several expert groups, which 
prepares international negotiations and agrees on 
negotiating positions which are then often reflected 
in Council conclusions (Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 
2008, p. 38). 
However, climate negotiations are already very 
complex and overburdened, and the building blocks 
for the Copenhagen Agreement imply an extensive 
linkage of different issues. We therefore suggest 
looking into possibilities to integrate strategies on 
climate-related debates within the WTO Doha 
Round. We offer two examples for which it might 
be feasible to further integrate country strategies in 
the Doha Round: first, the EU could consider 
linking its position on the relationship between the 
WTO and multilateral environmental agreements 
under DDA para. 31(i) to its position on the TRIPS 
agreement. In the former debate, the EU has asked 
for legal concessions under WTO law in favour of 
trade-related measures under multilateral 
environmental agreements, however meeting 
opposition from developing countries who fear 
green protectionism. But in the second debate, some 
developing countries have demanded concessions in 
favour of specific environmental concerns: Brazil, 
India and other countries have called for an 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to reflect 
requirements of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, in particular regarding the access and 
benefit-sharing of plant genetic resources. 
Moreover, some developing countries have asked 
for TRIPS exemptions to facilitate the transfer of 
climate-friendly technologies under DDA para. 
31.iii. With all these debates concerning some form 
of legal concessions under WTO law, there is 
potential for strategic issue linking: for instance, 
movement from one side on the debate between 
WTO and multilateral environmental agreements 
could trigger progress in TRIPS-related 
discussions.
7  
                                                                                      
technological know-how, could be a possible partner to 
explore this potential. 
7 Currently, such an issue-linkage might not be fully 
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A second option for issue linking are overlapping 
discussions on environmental goods and services, 
and biofuels. In the Doha Round, under DDA para. 
31.iii, the US and the EU have requested developing 
countries to liberalise trade policies to allow more 
transfers of environmental goods and services. 
Brazil and other developing countries have criticised 
the fact that the list of environmental goods and 
services presented by the EU and the US does not 
feature biofuels. Moreover, Brazil has included US 
subsidies of biofuels in a dispute it filed in the WTO 
in 2007 (Brewer, 2008, p. 24).
8 In light of this 
overlap, concessions from one or both sides on 
biofuels might help reinvigorate the debate on 
environmental goods and services. Such a 
concession could for instance come close to the idea 
of a ‘living list’ which could include biofuels that 
fulfil certain sustainability criteria. This 
consideration of sustainable biofuels would 
accommodate the interests of some developing 
countries and raise the chances of a more 
comprehensive deal on trade barrier removals for 
environmental goods and services. 
6.2  Market-based mitigation 
mechanisms 
Regarding the marketisation and privatisation of 
climate governance, a number of preliminary policy 
recommendations can be derived from ADAM 
research. 
Geographical Inequity: First, to address the 
inequitable regional distribution of CDM projects, 
increased institutional-capacity building efforts are 
                                                                                      
perfectly matching across these debates. For instance, in 
discussions under DDA para. 31(i), the EU faces rather 
steadfast opposition from all other countries, while in 
TRIPS Council discussions, the EU is much closer to the 
developing country position than the US. This 
notwithstanding, Switzerland and some EU countries 
have already demonstrated that some form of issue-
linkage with regard to TRIPS discussions is possible; in 
order to reach a package deal, they suggested linking 
their demand for an extension of provisions on 
geographical indication to the proposal on a TRIPS 
amendment on disclosure (as required by developing 
countries).  
8 The lack of internationally agreed criteria for 
sustainable biofuels production and the uncertainty about 
the legal status of biofuels equally concern the farm 
subsidies debate. Thus far, fuels made from crops, such 
as ethanol, are classified as agricultural goods (by the 
World Customs Organisation), while biodiesel is 
considered to be an industrial product (cf. Motaal, 2008). 
Subsequently, biofuels are discussed at different ends of 
the Doha debate. One possibility could be to only define 
biofuels as industrial goods and then predominantly 
discuss them in the para. 31(iii) debate. 
needed in many parts of the world. Another option 
is to stop dealing with all developing countries in a 
uniform approach. It makes sense to expect different 
things from LDCs and from emergent economies. 
CDM projects in LDC belong to what might be 
called ‘the high-end CDM market’ while CDM 
projects in emergent economies concern the overall 
goal of decarbonisation. Differentiation among the 
developing countries (especially for LDCs and 
SIDS) could be increased in various ways, for 
example further adapting the levies; discounting 
credits from non-LDCs or even through the use of 
quota systems (e.g. as suggested by Bolivia). 
Increased differentiation will always be difficult to 
achieve politically, but the climate regime needs to 
reflect the different economic conditions in the 
world. 
Sustainable Development: Second, to achieve 
sustainable development within the CDM 
framework an increased differentiation between 
project types and technologies might be a way 
forward. While a global standard for sustainability 
seems unfeasible (defining sustainability top-down 
has always met opposition from developing 
countries), there are suggestions for more nuanced 
ways of enhancing the contribution of the CDM to 
sustainable development. Differentiation is not as 
drastic as setting standards. Differentiation as an 
option means favouring projects with clear 
sustainable development co-benefits and 
discounting for projects with no or few sustainable 
development contributions. From a developing 
country perspective, CDMs contribution to 
sustainable development is, at least in principle, 
important. Suggestions to enhance the CDM’s 
contribution to this objective could be beneficial to 
developing countries, but differentiation might also 
conflict with the CDM’s other objectives (providing 
low-cost emissions reductions to Annex 1 
countries). A more radical option is to separate the 
two objectives of the CDM, leaving the achievement 
of sustainable development in developing countries 
to other mechanisms. 
This option would focus on the CDM as an 
instrument for cost-effective emission reductions 
and create a fund for sustainable development 
outside of the CDM. Such a fund could be 
specifically aimed at funding projects with high 
sustainable development benefits, but with high 
costs and questionable additionality, such as some 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. 
Sectoral CDM. Third, sectoral approaches are seen 
as promising since they are assumed to contribute to 
the structural changes necessary to promote long-
term mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in 
developing countries. They also have the potential 
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development benefits viable under the CDM. An 
evolving and up-scaled CDM, or a similar 
mechanism for climate collaboration between 
countries, will continue to generate concerns 
regarding additionality, emission reductions, 
sustainable development, and the transfer of 
financial and technological resources. Sectoral 
approaches are a popular notion but would require 
the development of quite different methodologies 
for additionality and baseline emissions compared to 
the current project-based CDM. 
Finally, discussions related to sectoral approaches 
have mainly been carried out at a theoretical level. 
One option is to launch a pilot phase with 
discounted sectoral credits to further examine the 
potential for sectoral CDM in practice. We need 
more and better knowledge about how additionality 
and baselines can be measured under different 
sectoral approaches. Since sectoral approaches 
require estimations of sectoral baselines and 
monitoring and verification of emission reductions, 
a pilot phase would be easiest to launch in advanced 
developing countries. An additional benefit for the 
participating countries would be an increased 
capacity to carry out national emission inventories. 
With regards to the question of bottom-up vs. top-
down approaches to ETS we highlight the following 
key points: 
First, combining elements of the different 
carbon market architectures (bottom-up and 
top-down) might be an option to address 
some of their anticipated shortcomings. For 
example, it is conceivable that the 
international community agrees on an 
approach where a group of countries willing 
to adopt binding economy-wide caps 
continues the intergovernmental cap-and-
trade system implemented by the Kyoto 
protocol after 2012. Unlike the Kyoto scheme 
this architecture can be designed as an open 
system, enabling other countries to join at 
later dates with either their entire economy or 
some sectors only, for example by linking 
their domestic emissions trading systems. 
Such an approach could be environmentally 
and economically more effective than pure 
bottom-up approaches, while being less prone 
to political stalemate and high transaction 
costs than the top-down approach. Also, by 
continuing to use the existing or reformed 
Kyoto mechanisms it would facilitate 
implementation of a future environmentally 
ambitious global trading architecture that 
builds on these pre-existing institutions that 
would otherwise cease to exist. 
Second, even though top-down architectures 
promise a superior environmental 
effectiveness, they could turn into a drastic 
set-back in as much as they represent ‘all-or-
nothing’ options – without a general 
agreement on burden-sharing, a complete 
political standstill would be imminent. In this 
case, bottom-up architectures, though only 
imperfect substitutes of top-down 
architectures, could enable co-operating 
regions to jointly reduce emissions in a cost-
effective manner even in the absence of a 
global accord. In particular, a transatlantic 
carbon market created by linking a future US 
ETS to the EU ETS could create strong 
political momentum for international climate 
policy. Linking the EU ETS to emerging 
trading systems in the Asia-Pacific region 
could integrate a third central pillar of the 
international carbon market. However, when 
linking trading systems, care needs be taken 
to ensure the environmental and economic 
integrity of the joint trading system. Also, 
linkages need to be assessed with regard to 
their potential of contributing to the European 
Union’s aim of achieving the 2°c target in a 
cost efficient manner. 
Finally, the two approaches are 
complementary in the sense that bottom-up 
architectures may serve as building blocks for 
comprehensive top-down architectures. 
Therefore, the devolution of inter-
governmental permit trading to the company 
level could increase the economic 
performance of the international carbon 
market. 
6.3  Adaptation to climate change and 
world politics 
The impacts and vulnerabilities towards climate 
change differ among world regions and are 
inherently uncertain. It is certain, however, that the 
impacts of climate change, even with a 2 to 3 degree 
range of warming, could have detrimental effects on 
where people can live as well as on their ability to 
produce and access food. 
One potential means of adaptation to meet this 
challenge could be improved access of farmers in 
developing countries to state-of-the-art research on 
farming technologies. So far developing countries 
are at a competitive disadvantage as a result of 
funding for agricultural research in general, 
including the protection offered to more adaptive 
crop seeds due to international intellectual property 
rights. Developed countries as well as the private 
sector may thus have a special role in aiding the 
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This support could come in the form of an 
adaptation levy to fund agricultural research in the 
south as well as a renegotiation of international 
intellectual property rights in the domain of 
agriculture. This could happen under what we call 
an Adaptation Food Security Protocol within the 
UNFCCC – the only global institution at present 
capable of bringing together the many diverse actors 
and institutions needed to bring about this change. 
Regarding the possible problem of millions of 
climate refugees in the decades to come, our 
research showed that the existing governance 
mechanisms are not sufficiently equipped to deal 
with this looming crisis. In our ADAM research, we 
have outlined a blueprint for a global governance 
architecture on the protection and resettlement of 
climate refugees. We argue against the extension of 
the definition of refugees under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees but 
rather for a new legal instrument specifically 
tailored for the needs of climate refugees – a 
Protocol on Recognition, Protection and  
Resettlement of Climate Refugees to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
– as well as a separate funding mechanism, the 
Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund.  
We have framed our proposal deliberatively not in 
terms of emergency response and disaster relief, but 
of planned and organised voluntary resettlement 
programmes. In particular when it comes to rises in 
sea level, there is no need to wait for extreme 
weather events to strike and islands and coastal 
regions to be flooded. All areas that cannot be 
protected through increased coastal defences for 
practical or economic reasons need to be included 
early in long-term resettlement and reintegration 
programmes that make the process acceptable and 
endurable for the affected people. This, however, 
calls for early action in terms of setting up effective 
and appropriate governance mechanisms. The 
planning for a climate refugee protocol and the 
related institutional settings cannot wait until 2050 
when it might be too late for orderly and organised 
responses. It must begin now. 
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